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Abstract. We formalize in a theorem prover the notion of provable anonymity. Our formalization relies
on inductive definitions of message distinguishing ability and observational equivalence on traces observed
by the intruder. Our theory differs from its original proposal and essentially boils down to the inductive
definition of distinguishing messages with respect to a knowledge set for the intruder. We build our theory
in Isabelle/HOL to achieve a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasibility
is illustrated through two case studies of the Crowds and Onion Routing protocols.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet community and the rapid advances in technology over the past
decades, people are getting used to carry out their daily activities through networked distributed systems
providing electronic services to users. In these systems, people become more and more concerned about their
privacy and how their personal information have been used. Typically, anonymity is a desired property of
such systems, referring to the ability of a user to own some data or take some actions without being tracked
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down. This property is essential in systems that involve sensitive personal data, like electronic auctions,
voting, anonymous broadcasts, file-sharing and etc. For example, users want to keep anonymous when they
visit a particular website or post their political opinions on a public bulletin board.
Due to its subtle nature, anonymity has also been the subject of many theoretical studies [39, 24, 23, 4,
21, 35, 37] and formal verification. The proposed definitions aim to capture either possibilistic [39, 24, 21, 35]
or probabilistic [23, 4, 14] aspects of anonymity, and formal verification treats systems in different application
domains, such as electronic voting systems [28, 13, 25], electronic cash protocols [32], file sharing [43, 11], and
electronic healthcare [17, 18], etc. However, automatic approaches to the formal verification of anonymity have
mostly focused on the model checking approach on systems with fixed configurations, e.g., [39, 40, 12, 14],
while theorem proving is a more suitable approach when dealing with general systems of infinite state
spaces [26]. We address this situation by investigating the possibility of using a powerful general-purpose
theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL [33], to semi-automatically verify anonymity properties. In this paper, we
focus on the framework of provable anonymity [21] and build a mechanical proof method for the analysis of
anonymity protocols.
The starting point of the provable anonymity approach is the idea that various information hiding prop-
erties can best be expressed in the language of epistemic logic. This makes it possible to reason not only
about the messages in a trace, but also about the knowledge agents gain from these messages. For instance,
sender anonymity can typically be formulated as the receiver not knowing who sent a certain message. Cen-
tral in the epistemic framework is the notion of observational equivalence of runs — a property holds for
a protocol if it is true on every run which is indistinguishable for the intruder. The distinguishing ability
of the intruder is formalized as the ability to distinguish two messages, which is in turn based on message
structures and relations between random messages. In the framework proposed by Garcia et al. [21], obser-
vational equivalence is actually constructed via the reinterpretation function. Proving two traces equivalent
essentially boils down to the existence of such a reinterpretation function. Within their framework, based on
observational equivalence Garcia et al. define a few epistemic operators and use them to express information
hiding properties such as sender anonymity and unlinkability
Although provable anonymity provides an elegant framework of anonymity in a uniform fashion, a deep
gap exists between a pen-and-paper provable anonymity theory and a mechanized theory library. To the best
of our knowledge, so far no one has formalized observation equivalence in the provable anonymity framework
and the construction of this relation mechanically. Our work is essential not only to bridge this gap, but
also to provide a mechanized proving methodology for anonymity protocols on the groundwork of provable
anonymity theory.
Our contribution. The main contribution of this paper is twofold: an inductive theory of provable anonymity
and its formalization in a theorem prover. We briefly discuss the novelties of our work below:
• We introduce an inductive definition of message distinguishability, which is believed to be a fundamental
concept. More precisely, the intruder can uniquely identify any plain-text message. Furthermore, the
intruder can distinguish any encrypted message for which he has the decryption key, or which he can
construct himself. The observational equivalence between two messages, which can be then lifted to traces
inductively, is naturally defined as the negation of message distinguishability. Namely, two messages are
observationally equivalent for an agent if he cannot distinguish them according to his own knowledge.
In [21], the notion of observational equivalence is proposed without formalization in mind. Our proposal
is a necessary step for its mechanical formalization.
• We propose the notion of alignment between two message sequences. Intuitively, alignment requires
that the relation, composed of the corresponding message pairs of the two message sequences, should be
single valued. Furthermore, the single valued requirement should remain valid after applying the analyzing
and synthesizing operations pairwisely to the message pairs in the relation. Combining the alignment
requirement with the observational equivalence between two messages, we propose an (adapted) definition
of observational equivalence between two traces. Thus, our framework can naturally incorporate the
concept of reinterpretation function which is extensively used in [21].
As mentioned before, in [21] no mechanical way is provided to construct a reinterpretation function. By
our inductive approach to construct the alignment between the message sequences, we can construct
such a reinterpretation function if it does exist. Furthermore, our work demonstrates that observational
equivalence between traces cannot be obtained by simply lifting the message equivalence to the traces.
Alignment between message sequences is required to make the constructed relation to be a bijection.
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• We proceed to formalize anonymity properties in an epistemic logic framework as in [21]. Box and diamond
operators are formalized at first, then sender anonymity and unlinkability are defined accordingly.
• We inductively define the semantics of anonymity protocols, e.g., Crowds and Onion Routing, as a set
of traces, and the relaying mechanism of the protocol is formally defined as a set of inductive rules. Fur-
thermore, we formally prove that the protocol realizes anonymity properties such as sender anonymity
and unlinkability under some circumstance by providing a method to construct an observationally equiv-
alent trace for a given trace via a method called swap messages. Formalizing the swap method and the
corresponding proof techniques are novel in the sense that they give us a generally applicable way to
construct an observationally equivalent trace.
• We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL [33] to have a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity
protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the mechanical framework through cases studies on Crowds [38]
and Onion Routing [22, 41]. Based on our framework, we can inductively model an anonymity protocol,
use epistemic operators to define anonymity properties, and follow the proof method to prove that the
anonymity protocol under study satisfies the desired anonymity properties.
There are two guiding principles for us to choose Isabelle to formalize our anonymity theory. Firstly our
induction techniques should be conveniently implemented by Isabelle/HOL. Isabelle/HOL is appropriate for
this task because of its support for inductively defined sets and its automatic tool support. Secondly, our
mechanized proofs correspond to their pen-and-paper counterparts as closely as possible. This means that
for a user who has completed his proofs manually, little extra effort is required in order to let Isabelle/HOL
check them.1
Note that this article is a revised and extended version of [30] that appears in the proceedings of the
6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. In this paper, we have developed a
new notion of alignment between two message sequences. Combining the alignment requirement with the
observational equivalence between two messages, we have proposed an improved definition of observational
equivalence between two traces, which in turn leads to a revised formalization of provable anonymity in
Isabelle/HOL. Thus, our framework can incorporate the concept of reinterpretation function which is ex-
tensively used in [21]. We have extended the case study on Onion Routing accordingly, and conducted a
new case study on Crowds. As a consequence of the new notion of alignment, we also devote an additional
subsection to prove the alignment requirement on observational equivalence between traces in the case study
on Onion protocols. One of our previous work [31] also adopts an inductive approach to formalizing the
strand space theory and implements the mechanical proof framework in Isabell/HOL. More specifically, the
semantics of a protocol session is inductively formalized as a bundle in a strand space in [31], and classic trace
properties such as secrecy and authentication are studied. In this work, the semantics of a protocol session is
inductively formalized as a trace as well. Different from [31], our inductive approach is further developed to
decide observational equivalence according to the adversary’s knowledge obtained in two separate sessions,
which is essential for defining anonymity properties.
Presentation of the paper. In this paper, we assume readers have some knowledge with Isabelle/HOL
syntax. Therefore, we present our formalization directly without elaborated explanation. Notably, a function
in Isabelle/HOL syntax is usually defined in a curried form instead of a tuple form, that is, we often use
the notation f x y to stand for f(x, y). We also use the notation [[A1;A2; ...;An]] =⇒ B to mean that with
assumptions A1, . . . , An, we can derive a conclusion B. Here, we briefly introduce some functions on lists,
which will be used in later sections of the paper: x#xs for the list that extends xs by adding x to the front
of xs, [x1, ..xn] for a list x1#..xn#[], xs@ys for the result list by concatenating xs with ys, xs!i for the i
th
element of the list xs (counting from 0 as the first element), set xs for the set of all the elements in xs,
length xs for the length of the list xs, last xs for the last element of the list xs, zip xs ys for the functions
which zips two lists xs and ys to generate a list of pairs, and map f xs for the function which applies f to
each element in xs. More information on our choices of notations can be found in the appendix.
Structure of the paper. Sect. 2 summarizes related papers in the literature. Sect. 3 provides a preliminary
introduction to notations and terminologies. Distinguishability and observational equivalence of messages are
formally defined in Sect. 4. Then we introduce the notion of alignment for two sequences of messages in Sect. 5.
1 Isabelle/HOL offers the Isar proof language [42], which is the abbreviation of the phrase “Intelligible semi-automated rea-
soning”. Isar is an alternative proof language interface layer beyond traditional tactical scripts and readable for human beings.
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Observational equivalence of traces is formally defined in Sect. 6. Epistemic operators and formalization of
anonymity properties are presented in Sect. 7. We model and analyze Crowds and Onion Routing in Sect. 8
and Sect. 9, respectively. We conclude the paper in Sect. 10.
2. Related work
In this section, we summarize existing papers which are mostly related to our work. Besides the inherence
and extension from the work on provable anonymity, our work is related to the work by Abadi and Cortier [2].
They introduce a notion of pattern equivalence which is also inductively defined to identify the observational
equivalence between messages w.r.t. a set of keys. Furthermore, the equivalence corresponds to computa-
tionally indistinguishable ensembles. This definition is somehow restricted as the set of keys is only allowed
to be symmetric, mainly because they focus on the computational soundness of the symbolic verification.
Another similar but more general, notion of message indistinguishability is static equivalence introduced
in the applied pi calculus [3, 1]. Cryptographic primitives can be modeled using equational theory, thus more
primitives can be incorporated in the framework, such as digital signature, XOR, etc. However this scheme
is based on the applied pi calculus and cannot be easily formalized in a theorem prover.
More recently, the paper [10] studies process equivalence with length tests with respect to both passive
and active intruders. A tool is developed for proving trace equivalence between two processes for a bounded
number of sessions, based on the decision procedure of [9]. In addition, the tool ProVerif [5] can check obser-
vational equivalence defined in the applied pi calculus automatically [6, 8] with respect to active intruders.
But it is not guaranteed to terminate and poses some restriction on the structure of processes.
In the literature, a proof method for checking branching bisimilarity [19, 20] is formalized in the theorem
prover PVS. But this approach cannot be directly applied for security protocol analysis (see e.g., [34]) as
it does not deal with message indistinguishability. Trace anonymity [39] is formalized using I/O automaton
and the Larch prover is employed for check trace anonymity [26]. An anonymous fair exchange e-commerce
protocol that is claimed to satisfy customer’s anonymity is analyzed by the OTS/CafeOBJ method [27]
following the approach proposed in [26]. However, these two works only consider a weaker intruder, which
does not have the same ability to distinguish message sequences as we consider in this paper.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Agents, messages and events
Agents send or receive messages. There are three kinds of agents: the server, the honest agents, and the spy.
Formally the type of agent is defined as follows:
agent ::= Server | Friend N | Spy
We use bad to denote the set of intruders, which at least includes the agent Spy. If an agent A is not in bad,
then A is honest.
The set of messages is defined using the following BNF notation:
h ::= Agent A | Nonce N | Key k | MPair h1 h2 | Crypt k h
where A is an element from agents, N and k from natural. We use k−1 to denote the inverse key of k for
brevity. MPair h1 h2 is called a composed message. Crypt k h represents the encryption of message h with k.
In an asymmetric key protocol model, an agent A has a public key pubK A, which is known to all
agents, and a private key priK A. pubK A is the inverse key of priK A, and vice versa. In a symmetric key
model, each agent A has a long-term symmetric key shrK A. The inverse key of shrK A is itself. We also
assume that (1) asymmetric keys and symmetry keys are disjoint; (2) the functions shrK, pubK and priK
are injective, e.g., if shrK A = shrK A′ then A = A′. In the following, we abbreviate Crypt k h as {|h|}k,
and MPair h1 . . .MPair hn−1 hn as {|h1, . . . , hn−1, hn|}. Such abbreviations are supported in Isabelle/HOL by
syntax translation [33].
Operators parts, analz, and synth are inductively defined on a message set H. Their definitions are taken
from [36] and tailored for our purposes. Usually, H contains a penetrator’s initial knowledge and all messages
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sent by regular agents. The set parts H is obtained from H by repeatedly adding the components of compound
messages and the bodies of encrypted messages. Formally, parts H is the least set including H and closed
under projection and decryption.
inductive set parts:: "msg set⇒msg set"
for H:: "msg set" where
Inj [intro]: "x∈ H =⇒ x∈ parts H"
|Fst: "{|x,y|} ∈ parts H =⇒ x∈ parts H"
|Snd: "{|x,y|} ∈ parts H =⇒ y∈ parts H"
|Body: "Crypt k x∈ parts H =⇒ x∈ parts H"
The parts operator can be used to define the subterm relation <: h1 < h2 ≡ h1 ∈ parts{h2}. Note that k is
not considered as occurring in {|g|}k unless k is a part of g.
Similarly, analz H is defined to be the least set including H and closed under projection and decryption
by known keys. Note that we use invKey k to formally denote the inverse key of Key k in our formalization.
inductive set analz:: "msg set⇒msg set"
for H :: "msg set" where
Inj [intro,simp] : "x∈ H =⇒ x∈ analz H"
|Fst: "{|x,y|} ∈ analz H =⇒ x∈ analz H"
|Snd: "{|x,y|} ∈ analz H =⇒ y∈ analz H"
|Decrypt [dest]:"[[Crypt k x∈ analz H;
Key (invKey k)∈analz H]]=⇒x∈ analz H"
The set synth H models the messages a spy could build up from elements of H by repeatedly adding
agent names, forming compound messages and encrypting with keys contained in H. synth H is defined to
be the least set that includes H, agents, and is closed under pairing and encryption.
inductive set synth:: "msg set⇒msg set"
for H :: "msg set" where
Inj [intro,simp] : "x∈ H =⇒ x∈ synth H"
|Fst: "[[x∈ synth H; y∈ synth H ]]=⇒ {|x,y|} ∈ synth H"
|Encrypt [dest]:"[[k∈ synth H;
x∈synth H]]=⇒Crypt k x∈ synth H"
A protocol’s behavior is specified as the set of possible traces of events. A trace model is concrete and easy
to explain. A trace is a sequence of events. An event is of the form: Says A B m, which means that A sends B
the message m. For an event ev = Says A B m, we define msgPart ev ≡ m, sender ev ≡ A, receiver ev ≡ B to
represent the message, sender and receiver of the event ev, respectively. Function initState A specifies agent
A’s initial knowledge. Typically, an agent’s initial knowledge consists of its private key and the public keys
of all agents.
The function knows A tr describes the set of messages which A can observe from the trace tr in addition
to his initial knowledge. Formally,
knows A []= initState A
knows A ((Says A’ B m)#evs)=
if (A=Spy)∨ (A’=A) ∨ (A=B)
then {m} ∪ knows A evs
else knows A evs
The set used evs formalizes the notion of freshness. The set includes the set of the parts of the messages
sent in the network as well as all messages held initially by any agent.
used []=
⋃
B. parts (initState B)
used ((Says A B m)#evs)= parts{m} ∪ used evs
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The function noncesOf msg ≡ {m.∃n.m < msg ∧m = Nonce n} defines the set of nonces occurring in
the message msg. The formula originates A m tr means that A originates a fresh message m in the trace tr.
originates A m []= False
originates A m ((Says A’ B’ msg)#evs=
if (originates A m evs)
then True
else if (m< msg ∧ A=A’) then True
else False
The predicate sends A m tr means that A sends a message m in an event of the trace tr. Formally,
sends A m []= False
sends A m ((Says A’ B’ msg)#evs)=
if (m<msg ∧ A=A’) then True
else sends A m evs
We define regularOrig m tr to represent that a message m is originated by an honest agent. Formally,
regularOrig m tr ≡ ∀A.originates A m tr −→ A /∈ bad. The predicate nonceDisj m tr specifies that the nonces
of message m are disjoint with any other messages occurring in the trace tr. Namely, if nonces of any message
m′ are not disjoint with those of m, then m = m′.
definition nonceDisj::"msg⇒ trace ⇒ bool"
where nonceDisj m tr ≡ ∀ A M m’.
Says A M m’∈(set tr)
∧ (noncesOf m’ ∩ noncesOf m 6= ∅) −→ m’=m
We define single valued r as ∀ x y. (x, y) ∈ r −→ (∀ z. (x, z) ∈ r −→ y = z). Obviously, if single valued r,
then a function f from the domain of r to range of r can be derived by f x = y if (x, y) ∈ r; otherwise
f x = x. If single valued r−1 also holds, then such f is a bijection.
Next we define a set of special lists: distinctList. If tr ∈ distinctList, i, j < length tr, and i 6= j, then we
have tri 6= trj . Here, tri is the i-th element of the list tr. Namely, two elements of tr are different.
inductive set distinctList::(’a list) set where
nilDiff: "[] ∈ distinctList"
|consDiff: "[[tr ∈ distinctList;
∀ l.l∈(set tr) −→ l 6= a]]=⇒ (a#tr) ∈ distinctList"
3.2. Intruder model
We discuss anonymity properties based on observations of the intruder. In this section, we explain our
intruder model. Dolev-Yao intruder model [16] is considered standard in the field of formal symbolic analysis
of security protocols. In this model the network is completely under the control of the intruder: all messages
sent on the network are read by the intruder; all received messages on the network are created or forwarded by
the intruder; the intruder can also remove messages from the network. However, in the analysis of anonymity
protocols, often a weaker attacker model is assumed – the intruder is passive in the sense that he observes all
network traffic, but does not actively modify the messages or inject new messages. Therefore, we only need
one kind of event Says A B x in our theory, which means that A sends a message x to B, and B receives the
message. This semantics is subtly different from [36], where A intends to send a message x to B, but B does
not necessarily receive the message. Besides, the intruder can analyze the messages that he has observed,
which is modeled by the operator analz. In the later sections on case studies, we will point out that some
anonymity properties cannot be kept if we have the Dolev-Yao intruder model instead.
Contrary to the intruder, the regular agents are not necessarily aware of all the events. We adopt the
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convention that they only see the events in which they are involved as either sender or receiver. According
to the above arguments, we can formalize the notion of visible part of a trace.
view A [] =[]" |
view A ((Says A’ B x)#evs) =
if A = Spy then (Says A’ B x)# evs
else if (A’=A ∨ B=A) then ((Says A’ B x) # (view A evs))
else (view A evs)
4. Message Distinguishability
In this section, we focus on modeling the ability for an agent to distinguish two received messages based on
his knowledge. In principle, an agent can uniquely identify any plain-text message he observes. Furthermore,
an agent can distinguish any encrypted message for which he possesses the decryption key, or which he can
construct himself. Formally, if m and m′ are of different type of messages, for instance, if m = Agent A
and m′ = Nonce n, the agent can immediately tell the difference. If both m and m′ are composed messages,
namely, m = {|m1,m2|} and m′ = {|m′1,m′2|}, the agent can distinguish m and m′ if he either distinguishes
m1 from m
′
1 or m2 from m
′
2. If m = {|x|}k1 and m′ = {|y|}k2 , then the agent must use the knowledge Kn he
possesses to decide whether the two messages are different. There are five cases as shown below:
1. Both k1 and k2 are in Kn, x and y are in Kn as well, and the agent can distinguish x and y, then he
can tell the difference between m and m′ as he knows that m and m′ are different encrypted messages
containing different plain texts.
2. Both k1 and k2 are in Kn, x, y are in Kn as well, and the agent can distinguish k1 and k2 but not x
and y, then he also can tell the difference between m and m′ as he knows that m and m′ are different
messages encrypted by different keys.
3. Both x and k1 are in Kn, and the agent knows that he can construct m from x and k1. However, either
y or k2 is not in Kn. The agent can also tell the difference between m and m
′ as m can be constructed
by himself, but m′ cannot be constructed by himself.
4. If k−11 , k
−1
2 ∈ Kn, and the agent can distinguish x and y, then he also can tell the difference between m
and m′ as he knows that m and m′ can be decrypted into different messages by using k−11 and k
−1
2 .
5. If k−11 is in Kn, and k
−1
1 6= k−12 , then there are two subcases, (1) either k−12 ∈ Kn, thus the agent can
tell the difference between them as he knows that the two messages can be decrypted by using different
keys; (2) or k−12 /∈ Kn, thus the agent can also tell the difference between them as he knows that m can
be decrypted but m′ cannot be decrypted.
We capture the above ideas by the following formalization in Isabelle/HOL.
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definition basicDiff:: "msg⇒msg⇒bool"
where "basicDiff m m’ ≡
case m of (Agent a) ⇒ m 6= m’
| (Number n) ⇒ m 6= m’
| (Nonce n) ⇒ m 6= m’
| (Key k) ⇒ m 6= m’
| (MPair m1 m2) ⇒ ∀ m1’ m2’ . m’ 6= (MPair m1’ m2’)
| (Crypt k n) ⇒ ∀ k’ n’ . m’ 6= (Crypt k’ n’)
inductive set Diff:: "msg set ⇒ (msg×msg) set"
for Kn:: "msg set" where
basic:"[[x∈Kn; y∈Kn; basicDiff x y]]
=⇒ (x,y)∈ Diff Kn"
| MPLDiff:"[[w∈Kn; z∈Kn; (x,y)∈Diff Kn]]
=⇒ (MPair x w, MPair y z)∈Diff Kn"
| MPRDiff:"[[w∈Kn; z∈Kn; (x,y)∈Diff Kn]]
=⇒ (MPair w x, MPair z y)∈Diff Kn"
| CryptDiff1:"[[(Key k1∈Kn); (Key k2∈Kn); (x,y)∈Diff Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff Kn"
| CryptDiff2:"[[x∈Kn; y∈Kn; (Key k1,Key k2)∈Diff Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff Kn"
| CryptDiff3:"[[y/∈Kn∨Key k2 /∈ Kn; x∈Kn; Key k1 ∈ Kn; Crypt k2 y∈Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff Kn"
| CryptDiff4:"[[y/∈Kn∨Key k2 /∈ Kn; x∈Kn; Key k1 ∈ Kn; Crypt k2 y∈Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k2 y, Crypt k1 x)∈Diff Kn"
| DeCryptDiff1:"[[(Crypt k1 x)∈Kn; (Crypt k2 y)∈Kn;
(Key (invKey k1)∈Kn); (Key (invKey k2)∈Kn); (x,y)∈Diff Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff Kn"
| DecryptDiff2:"[[(Crypt k1 x)∈Kn; (Crypt k2 y)∈Kn;
(Key (invKey k1))∈Kn; (Key (invKey k1))6=(Key (invKey k2))]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff Kn"
| DecryptDiff3:"[[(Crypt k1 x)∈Kn; (Crypt k2 y)∈Kn;
(Key (invKey k1))∈Kn; (Key (invKey k1))6=(Key (invKey k2))]]
=⇒ (Crypt k2 y, Crypt k1 x)∈Diff Kn"
Note that rules CryptDiff3 and CryptDiff4 are two symmetric subcases of case 3, and rules DecryptDiff2
and DecryptDiff3 are two subcases of case 5.
In this paper, when we discuss Diff Kn, we always assume that Kn is a closure set under the analz and
then synth operators. Namely, Kn = synth (analz Kn) for some message set Kn which is directly observed
from network traffics.
Example 1. Let m = {|Nonce n|}pubK B , and m′ = {|Nonce n′|}pubK B , with n 6= n′. We also assume Kn =
synth (analz{Key (priK B),m,m′}). We have (m,m′) ∈ Diff Kn by applying rule basic and rule CryptDiff.
In Example 1, the two messages m and m′ are two encrypted messages by the same key pubK B, if the
key pubK B is in Kn, then the two messages can be decrypted and distinguished.
Example 2. Let n′0 6= n, n′0 6= n′, n 6= n′, A 6= B, n0 6= n, n0 6= n′, m = Nonce n, m′ = Nonce n′, m0 ={|m|}pubK B , m′0 = {|m′|}pubK B , m1 = {|Nonce n0,m0|}, m′1 = {|Nonce n′0,m′0|}, m2 = {|Agent B,m1|}pubK A,
m′2 = {|AgentB,m′1|}pubK A. IfKn = synth(analz {m0,m′0,m2,m′2,Key (pubKA),Key (pubKB),Key (priKB)}),
then we have (m2,m
′
2) /∈ Diff Kn.
In Example 2, as priK B, m0 and m
′
0 are in Kn, thus Nonce n ∈ Kn and Nonce n′ ∈ Kn. The conditions
n0 6=n and n0 6=n′ eliminate the possibility of the case when Nonce n0 ∈ Kn. Similarly, we can derive that
Nonce n′0 /∈ Kn.
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We then introduce the notion of observational equivalence between messages which is naturally defined
as the negation of message distinguishability. If an agent cannot distinguish two messages m and m′, then
the two messages are observationally equivalent to the agent.
msgEq::"msg set⇒msg⇒msg⇒bool"
"msgEq Know m1 m2 ≡ (m1, m2)/∈ Diff Know"
Obviously, observational equivalence between messages w.r.t. a knowledge set Kn is reflexive, symmetric and
transitive, which are captured by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1. msgEq Kn m m
Lemma 2. msgEq Kn m m′ =⇒ msgEq Kn m′ m
Lemma 3. [[msgEq Kn m1 m2; msgEq Kn m2 m3]] =⇒ msgEq Kn m1 m3
5. Alignment between Message Sequences
An immediate idea is to lift the observation equivalence directly to two message sequences by imposing the
requirement that each corresponding message pair in the two sequences should be observationally equivalent.
However, it is subtle to define the observational equivalence between two message sequences. For instance,
there are two runs msgSq and msgSq′ of a protocol, as shown in Table 1. Let Kn = synth(anlaz {m,m′,m′′}),
m 6= m′. Even if we have msgEq Kn m m′ and msgEq Kn m m′′, msgSq and msgSq′ should still be different
from an observer’s view, because the same message m occurs twice in msgSq while two different messages
m′ and m′′ occur in the corresponding positions of msgSq′.
In order to define observational equivalence between two traces (see Sect. 6), we propose an additional
requirement, called “alignment”, on two message sequences. The intuitive idea of our alignment requirement
is that the relation, composed of corresponding message pairs in two message sequences, should be single-
valued. Alignment requires that a message should have only one interpretation when we map messages from
a message sequence to the other message sequence. Furthermore, single-valued requirement should remain
valid after applying the analyzing operation (e.g., decryption and separation) and synthesizing operation
(e.g., encryption and concatenation ) pair-wisely on the message pairs in the two message lists of the two
message sequences. This matches well with the reinterpretation function as defined in [21].
From Examples 3 to 5, we use two message sequences msgSq and msgSq′ to explain the above two




1 are pairwise different nonces.
Example 3. If priK B and priK B′ are not compromised, thenmsgSq andmsgSq′ as shown in Table 2 are dif-
ferent, as the intruder can decrypt the first and second messages and compare them with the third and fourth
messages in the above message sequences. (After applying the decryption operation to the first messages pair-
wise in the two message sequences, the intruder obtains a new pair ({|Nonce n′0|}pubK B , {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′).
But this pair and ({|Nonce n′0|}pubK B , {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B) contradicts with the single-valued requirement.)
Example 4. If priK B and priK B′ and priK M are not compromised, then msgSq and msgSq′ as shown
in Table 3 are different, as the intruder can encrypt the third and fourth messages and compare them
with the first and second messages in the above two sequences. (After applying the encryption operation
to third messages pairwisely in the two message sequences, the intruder obtains a new pair of the following
form ({|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M , {|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M ). But this pair and ({|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M ,
{|{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}pubK M ) contradicts with the single-valued requirement.)
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Table 2. Two non-alignment message sequences for Example 3
msgSq msgSq′
{|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}priK M {|{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}priK M
{|{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}priK M {|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}priK M
{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B
{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′
Table 3. Two non-alignment message sequences for Example 4
msgSq msgSq′
{|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M {|{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}pubK M
{|{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}pubK M {|{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M
{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B
{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′
Example 5. If priK B and priK B′ and priK M are not compromised, msgSq and msgSq′ as shown in
Table 4 should be equivalent w.r.t. an intruder as all the messages cannot be analyzed and the linkage of
messages in a trace cannot be established.
More formally, we first inductively define two more operators analz pairs and synth pairs to formalize the
pairwise analyzing and synthesizing operations on the message pairs between two sets of message pairs.
inductive set analz pairs::"(msg×msg) set⇒msg set⇒(msg×msg) set"
for r ::"(msg×msg) set" and Kn::"msg set"
where rAtom [intro]: "[[(x,y):r]]=⇒ (x, y)∈ analz pairs r Kn"
| MPairL closure [intro]: "[[({|x,y|},{|x’,y’|}) ∈analz pairs r Kn]]
=⇒(x,x’)∈analz pairs r Kn"
| MPairR closure [intro]: "[[({|x,y|},{|x’,y’|}) ∈analz pairs r Kn]]
=⇒(y,y’)∈analz pairs r Kn"
| deCrypt closure [intro]: "[[(Crypt k x,Crypt k x’)∈analz pairs r Kn;
Key (invKey k)∈Kn ]] =⇒ (x,x’)∈analz pairs r Kn"
inductive set synth pairs::"(msg ×msg) set⇒msg set⇒(msg×msg) set"
for r ::"(msg× msg) set" and Kn::"msg set"
where basicAtom [intro]: "[[x∈Kn; isAtom x]]=⇒ (x, x)∈ synth pairs r Kn"
| rAtom [intro]: "[[(x,y)∈r ]]=⇒ (x, y)∈ synth pairs r Kn"
| MPair closure [intro]: "[[(x,x’)∈synth pairs r Kn;
(y,y’)∈ synth pairs r Kn]]=⇒ ([[x,y]],[[x’,y’]])∈ synth pairs r Kn"
| Crypt closure [intro]: "[[(x,x’)∈synth pairs r Kn; Key k∈Kn]]
=⇒ (Crypt k x, Crypt k x’)∈synth pairs r Kn"
Table 4. Two alignment message sequences for Example 5
msgSq msgSq′
{|Nonce n0,Agent B, {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M {|Nonce n1,Agent B′, {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}pubK M
{|Nonce n1, Agent B′, {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ |}pubK M {|Nonce n0,Agent B, {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B |}pubK M
{|Nonce n′0|}pubK B {|Nonce n′0|}pubK B
{|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′ {|Nonce n′1|}pubK B′
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The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a function mapping, which is naturally
derived from synth pairs r Kn provided that r is single-valued.
Lemma 4. [[single valued r; (x, y) ∈ (synth pairs r Kn); (x′, y′) ∈ synth pairs r Kn; x = x′;
∀ m m′ m′′.(m,m′′) ∈ synth pairs r Kn −→ ((m,m′) ∈ r −→ m′ = m′′) ]] =⇒ y = y′
We cannot establish a similar result for the analz pairs operator. For instance, let r = {({|Nonce n,Nonce n|},
{|Nonce n,Nonce n′|})}. It is easy to verify that analz pairs r Kn={(Nonce n,Nonce n), (Nonce n,Nonce n′)}.
We have single valued r and ∀ m m′ m′′.(m,m′′) ∈ analz pairs r Kn −→ (m,m′) ∈ r −→ m′ = m′′. But
analz pairs r Kn is not single valued.
6. Observational Equivalence between Traces
Now we can lift observational equivalence to traces with the concepts of observational equivalence between
messages and alignment between two message sequences: two sequences of messages in two traces look the
same to an observer if a message in one sequence is observationally equivalent to the corresponding message
in the other sequence w.r.t. the knowledge which the observer has obtained from the two traces. Besides
the requirement on the message parts of the two traces, we require that the sender and receiver of an event
in one trace is the same as those of the corresponding event in the other trace. For events ev1 and ev2,
we define SRMatch ev1 ev2 ≡ (sender ev1 = sender ev2) ∧ (receiver ev1 = receiver ev2). For two traces tr
and tr′, SRMatchL tr tr′ ≡ length tr = length tr′ ∧ ∀ i.i < length tr −→ SRMatch tri tr′i. The predicate
SRMatchL tr tr′ means that each event tri has the same sender and receiver as its corresponding event tr′i
and the two traces have the same length.
Two traces tr and tr′ are observationally equivalent (tr ≈A tr′), if the following conditions are satisfied:
• tr and tr′ have the same length; and for all events in tri, the senders and receivers of tri are the same as
those of tr′i.
• msgPart tri and msgPart tr′i are observationally equivalent w.r.t. the knowledge obtained after observing
the two traces.
• single valued r and single valued r−1 guarantee that an agent cannot reinterpret any event differently,
where r (r−1) is the sequence of message pairs obtained from tr and tr′ (tr′ and tr) after applying the
operations analz pairs and synth pairs.
The corresponding formalization in Isabelle/HOL is given below.
definition obsEquiv::"agent⇒trace⇒trace⇒bool"
where "obsEquiv A tr tr’≡
let vtr=view A tr in let vtr’=view A tr’ in
let msgSq=map msgPart vtr in let msgSq’=map msgPart vtr’ in
(set msgSq)=(set msgSq’) ∧ length vtr=length vtr’∧ SRMatchL vtr vtr’∧
(let H=set (zip msgSq msgSq’) in
let Kn=synth (analz (knows A vtr)) in
(∀ x y. (x,y)∈ H −→ msgEq Kn x y)∧
(let r=synth pairs (analz pairs H Kn) Kn in
(single valued r ∧ single valued (r−1)))"
Remark 1. In the work of Garcia et al. [21], a reinterpretation function between two message sequences
is used as an underlining concept. However, no one has formally argued when such a function exists and
how it can be derived. In our work, the alignment requirement between the two message sequences gives a
sufficient condition for the existence of a reinterpretation function. Moreover, the two operators analz pairs
and synth pairs give a mechanical way to derive such a function. Note that if both single valued r and
single valued (r−1), we can naturally construct a bijection function between the domain of r to its range.
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7. Epistemic Operators and Anonymity Properties
Using the observational equivalence relations over a trace set of possible worlds, we can formally introduce
epistemic operators [21] as follows:
constdefs box::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool"
"box A tr trs Assert≡ ∀ tr’.tr’∈trs−→obsEquiv A tr tr’ −→(Assert tr’)"
constdefs diamond::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool"
"diamond A tr trs Assert≡ ∃ tr’.tr’∈trs ∧obsEquiv A tr tr’ ∧(Assert tr’)"
For notation convenience, we write tr |=  A trs ϕ for box A tr trs ϕ, and tr |= 3 A trs ϕ for
diamond A tr trs ϕ. Note that ϕ is a predicate on a trace. Intuitively, tr |=  A trs ϕ means that for any
trace tr′ in trs, if tr′ is observationally equivalent to tr for agent A, then tr′ satisfies the assertion ϕ. On
the other hand, tr |= 3 A trs ϕ means that there is a trace tr′ in trs, tr′ is observationally equivalent to tr
for agent A and tr′ satisfies the assertion ϕ. Now we can formulate some information hiding properties in
our epistemic language. We use the standard notion of an anonymity set: it is a collection of agents among
which a given agent is not identifiable. The larger this set is, the more anonymous an agent is.
7.1. Sender anonymity
Suppose that tr is a trace of a protocol in which a message m is originated by some agent. We say that
tr provides sender anonymity w.r.t. the anonymity set AS and a set of possible runs in the view of B if it
satisfies the following condition:
constdefs senderAnomity::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool"
"senderAnomity AS B m tr trs≡ (∀ X.X∈AS−→ tr |=3B trs (originates X m))"
Here, AS is the set of agents who are under consideration, and trs is the set of all the traces which B can
observe. Intuitively, this definition means that each agent in AS can originate m in a trace of trs. Therefore,
this means that B cannot be sure of anyone who originates this message.
7.2. Unlinkability
We say that a trace tr provides unlinkability for user A and a message m w.r.t. the anonymity set AS if
constdefs unlinkability::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool"
"unlinkability AS A m tr trs≡
(let P= λX m’ tr. originates X m’ tr in
(¬(tr |=2 Spy trs (P A m))) ∧ senderAnomity AS A m tr trs
where the left side of the conjunction means that the intruder is not certain whether A has sent the message
m, while the right side means that every other user could have sent m.
All the definitions, lemmas, and proofs in this section are implemented in a formal theory anonymity.thy,
which provides a mechanized library for anonymity protocol analysis. This theory comprises 2,462 lines.
Its execution needs only 40 seconds. We make these Isabelle codes available at [29]. Our experiments are
performed on the 64-bit Isabelle-2012 version, which is run on the Sugon 64-bit computing server platform
which has a 160-multicore Intel Xeon CPU with 2.40GHz.
8. Case Study I: Crowds
The Crowds system [38] is a system for performing anonymous web transactions based on the idea that
anonymity can be provided by hiding in a crowd. For simplicity reasons, we only model the request part as
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specified in [21]: when an agent wants to send a request to a server, he randomly selects a user from a crowd
of users and asks this user to forward the request for him to the server; and this user then either forwards the
request to the server, or selects another random user from the crowd to do the forwarding. The specification
of Crowds is shown as below:
inductive set Crowds:: trace set where
CrowdsNil: [] ∈ (Crowds)
| CrowdsInit: [[tr∈Crowds; Nonce n/∈(used tr);R6=Server; A6=Server]]
=⇒Says A R {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#tr∈Crowds
| CrowdsRelay: [[tr∈Crowds; Says R R’ {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}∈set tr;
R’6=Server; R’’ 6=Server]]
=⇒Says R’ R’’ {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#tr∈Crowds
| CrowdsSend: [[tr∈Crowds; Says R R’ {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}∈set tr;
R’6=Server; ∀R’. Says R’ Server (Nonce n)/∈set tr ]]
=⇒Says R’ Server (Nonce n)#tr∈Crowds
In the above formalization, rule crowdNil specifies an empty trace. The other rules specify trace’s ex-
tension with protocol steps. More precisely,
• rule CrowdsInit models that an agent A, who is not the Server, originates a requests. Here, we model
new requests as fresh nonces. The agent randomly selects a user R from a crowd of users and asks this
user to forward the request for him to the Server;
• rule CrowdsRelay specifies that a relay R′ selects another random user R′′ again from the crowd to do
the forwarding. Here, we simply require that R′′ is not the Server;
• rule CrowdsSend models that a relay R′ forwards the request to the Server. Here, the requirement
∀R′.Says R′ Server (Nonce n) /∈ set tr specifies that no other user has sent the request to the Server
before.
The following lemma simply states the fact that a request forwarded to the server must be initiated by
an agent before.
Lemma 5. [[tr ∈ Crowds; Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr]]=⇒
∃A B.Says A B {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} ∈ set tr
Suppose that there exists an event Says A B {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} occurring in a trace tr, then there ex-
ist two subtrace tr1 and tr2, two agentsA
′ andB′ such that tr = tr1@(SaysA′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2)
and the subtrace tr2 does not contain any event whose message is of the form {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}. We
can prove it simply by induction on tr.
Lemma 6. [[Says A B {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} ∈ set tr]] =⇒
∃tr1 tr2 A′ B′.tr = tr1@(Says A′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2)
∧(∀ A B.Says A B {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} /∈ set tr2)
By the above two lemmas, and since {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} does not occur in tr2, thus we can know
that the agent A′ originates the nonce n.
Lemma 7. [[ tr ∈ Crowds; Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr]] =⇒ ∃A.originates A (Nonce n) tr
Assume that tr = tr1@Says A
′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2 is a trace in Crowds, and the mes-
sage {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} does not occur in tr2. Namely, A′ is the agent who originates the request
{|Agent Server,Nonce n|}. We can add a new event Says A A′{|Agent Server,Nonce n|} before tr2. Then the
new trace tr1@(Says A
′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#Says A A′{|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2 is still a valid
trace in Crowds. This is formulated in the next lemma, which is crucial to prove sender anonymity for agent
A′ as another agent A seems possible for the observer to initiate the request as well. This is due to the fact
that the newly constructed trace is valid in the Crowds system.
Lemma 8. [[ tr ∈ crowd; tr = tr1@(Says A′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2);
(∀A B.Says A B{|Agent Server, Nonce n|} /∈ set tr2) ]]=⇒
tr1@(Says A
′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#Says A A′{|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2) ∈ Crowds
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Suppose that the Server receives a request (identified by a nonce Nonce n), then the Server cannot be sure
of which agent originates the request. That is to say, the sender anonymity holds for the Server w.r.t any
anonymity agent set not containing the Server.
Lemma 9. [[tr ∈ Crowds; Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr]]=⇒
senderAnonymity {A.A 6= Server} Server (Nonce n) tr Crowds
Proof. By unfolding the definition of senderAnonymity, for any agent X such that X 6= Server, we need
to find a trace tr′ such that tr′ ∈ Crowds, obsEquiv Server tr tr′ and originates X (Nonce n) tr′. By
Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr and Lemma 7, there exists an agent A such that originates A (Nonce n) tr.
There are two cases:
(1)A = X. Then we simply let tr′ = tr.
(2)A 6= X. By Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr, and Lemma 5, there exist agents A and B such that
Says A B {|Agent Server,Nonce n|} ∈ set tr. Then by Lemma 6, there exist tr1, tr2, A′, and B′ such
that tr can be transformed into tr1@Says A
′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2, and we have the fact that
∀C D.Says C D{|Agent Server,Nonce n|} /∈ set tr2. Then we can construct tr′ as tr1@Says A′ B′ {|Agent Server,
Nonce n|} (Says X A′{|Agent Server,Nonce n|})#tr2. By Lemma 8, we have tr′ ∈ Crowds. By Lemma 7,
originates X (Nonce n) tr′. Obviously, from the inductive definition of Crowds, we have A′ 6= Server. It is
easy to verify that view Server tr′= view Server tr. Then we can derive obsEquiv Server tr tr′.
The sender anonymity comes from the local view of the agent Server, and the nondeterministic choice of
a relay who either forwards a request again or directly sends the request to the Server. However, for the Spy,
who observes the global network traffic, the sender anonymity does not hold. Namely, the Spy can be sure
of the agent who originates a request. This can be formalized and proved as Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. [[ tr ∈ Crowds; tr = tr1@(Says A′ B′ {|Agent Server,Nonce n|}#tr2);
(∀A B.Says A B{|Agent Server,Nonce n|} /∈ set tr2)]] =⇒
 Spy tr Crowds (originates A (Nonce n))
Analyzing the Crowds system only took us 5 days. The proof script comprises 695 lines, and executes in
20 seconds.
9. Case Study II: Onion Routing
Onion Routing [22, 41] provides both sender and receiver anonymity for communication over the Internet
and servers as the basis of the Tor network [15]. Its main idea is based on Chaum’s mix cascades [7]
that messages in Onion Routing have a layered encryption (thus called onions) and travel from source to
destination via a sequence of proxies (called onion routers). Each onion router can decrypt (or peel) one
layer of a received message and forward the remainder to the next onion router. In order to disguise the
relations between incoming and outgoing messages, an onion router collects incoming messages until it has
received k messages, and then permutes the messages and sends in batch to their intended receivers.
9.1. Modeling Onion Routing
In this paper, we model a simplified version of Onion Routing with only one onion router as done in [21].
We assume a set of users AS and one router M , with M /∈ AS. We also assume that each agent can send
a message before the router M launches a batch of forwarding process, and the router does not accept any
message when it is forwarding.
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inductive set oneOnionSession:: "nat⇒agent⇒trace set"
for i::"nat" and M::"agent" where
onionNil: "[]∈ (oneOnionSession i M)"
| onionCons1: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession i M);X6=M;Y6=M;
Nonce n0/∈(used tr);Nonce n/∈(used tr); length tr<i]]=⇒
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|})
#tr ∈oneOnionSession i M"
| onionCons2: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession i M);X6=M;
Nonce n/∈(used tr);length tr<i]]=⇒
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) (Nonce n)) #tr ∈oneOnionSession i M"
| onionCons3: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession i M);length tr≥i;
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}) ∈ (set tr);
Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n))/∈(set tr)]]=⇒
Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)) #tr ∈oneOnionSession i M"
In the above specification of Onion Routing, there are four induction rules. Rule onionNil specifies an
empty trace. The other rules specify trace’s extension with protocol steps. The ideas behind these induction
rules (onionCons1, onionCons2, onionCons3) are explained as follows.
• If the length of the current trace is less than i, namely, M is still in the receiving status, X (or Y ) and M
are distinct, and both n0 and n are fresh, an event Says X M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M
can be added. This step means that X sends a message to M which will later be peeled and forwarded
to Y by M .
• If the length of the current trace is less than i, X and M are distinct, and n is fresh, then we can add an
event Says X M{|NonceN |}pubK M . This means that X sends a dummy message to M which will later be
simply discarded.
• If the length of the current trace is greater than or equal to i, this means that M is in the forwarding
status, and if a received message of the form {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M has not been
forwarded by the router yet, then we can add an event Says M Y {|Nonce n|}pubK Y . This step means that
the router M forwards the peeled message to Y .
In our analysis, the intruder is passive in the sense that the spy (intruder) will not modify the network
traffic. An active intruder can easily infer the receiver of a message m forwarded to some agent. He only
needs to intercept any other message except for the message m, and replace them by dummy messages.
Because all dummy messages will be discarded by the router, and only m will be peeled and forwarded to
the intended receiver.
9.2. An overview our proof strategy
In the following sections, we will formalize and prove the anonymity properties of Onion Routing. Due to
the complexity of the epistemic operators in property definitions, the proof is rather complicated. We give
an overview of our formalization and the main proof steps.
We will formalize the sender anonymity and unlinkabilty of Onion Routing in the view of a Spy for a trace
tr w.r.t. a set of honest agents and all possible traces. According to the definitions of epistemic operators,
which are used in the definition of sender anonymity and unlinkability, we need to construct another trace
tr′ which satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) tr′ is still an Onion Routing trace, namely, tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(2) tr′ is observationally equivalent to tr. That is to say, obsEquiv Spy tr tr′. In order to show this, by the
definition of obsEquiv, we need to prove four conditions. The first two conditions are straightforward, but
the latter two are rather difficult: (i) msgPart tri and msgPart tr
′
i for any i < length tr are observationally
equivalent w.r.t. the knowledge obtained after observing the two traces; (ii) the alignment requirements
single valued r and single valued r−1 where r is the sequence of message pairs obtained from tr and tr′
after applying the operations analz pairs and synth pairs.
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Sect. 9.4 formally introduces a function swap ma mb tr, which servers the purpose of constructing such
an equivalent trace tr′. Here ma, mb are the messages sent to the router in the trace tr. Sect. 9.4.1 gives its
formal definition and proves simple correspondence properties of the swap function. Sect. 9.4.2 proves the
first condition (1). Sect. 9.4.3 devotes to the proof of the condition (2-ii), and Sect. 9.4.4 proves the condition
(2-i), then completes the proof of (2). In order to prove (2-i), we need to prove properties such as secrecy
and correspondence properties of Onion Routing, which are discussed in Sect. 9.3. After these, we finish the
proofs of the two anonymity properties in Sect. 9.5.
9.3. Properties on protocol sessions
As mentioned before, whether two traces are observationally equivalent for an agent depends on the knowl-
edge of the agent after his observation of the two traces. Therefore, we need to discuss some properties on
the knowledge of the intruder. They are secrecy properties, and some regularity on the correspondence of
the events in one protocol session of Onion Routing.
9.3.1. Correspondence properties
The following lemma is about the correspondence of two events in a trace tr. If the router M forwards a mes-
sage {|Nonce n|}pubK Y , then there exists an agentA who has sent {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M .
Lemma 11. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says M B {|Nonce n|}pubK Y ∈ set tr]]
=⇒ ∃n0 A.Says A M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M ∈ set tr
If {|Nonce n|}pubK Y is a submessage of a message which A sends to the router M , then {|Nonce n|}pubK Y
is originated by A.
Lemma 12. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; ma′ = {|Nonce n|}pubK Y ; Says A M ma ∈ set tr;ma′ < ma]]
=⇒ originates A ma′ tr
9.3.2. Uniqueness properties
Since an agent is required to originate fresh nonces when he sends a message to the router, thus if two events
where agents send a message to the router M , either two events are exactly the same, or nonces used in the
two events are disjoint.
Lemma 13. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says X M ma; Says Y M mb]]
=⇒ (X = Y ∧ma = mb) ∨ (noncesOf ma ∩ noncesOf mb) = ∅
From Lemma 13, we can easily derive that once a nonce n occurs in a message sent by an agent X, then
another agent Y cannot originate a message containing the same nonce n.
Lemma 14. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says X M ma; X 6= Y ; {|Nonce n|}pubK Y < ma]]
=⇒ ¬originates Y ({|Nonce n|}pubK Y ) tr
As a consequence, the message of each event in a trace of the protocol is unique, namely two messages in
two events in this trace are different.
Lemma 15. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ]] =⇒ map msgPart tr ∈ distinctList
With the above lemma, we can derive that the relation (zip (map msgPart tr) sq) must be single valued
if tr is in a trace of Onion Routing. Here, we use sq to indicate a message sequence of the same length.
Lemma 16. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ]] =⇒ single valued (zip (map msgPart tr) sq)
9.3.3. Secrecy properties
First we need to introduce a new predicate:
nonLeakMsg m M ≡
∀ B n0 n.(m = (Crypt (pubK M){|Nonce n0,Agent B,Crypt (pubK B)(Nonce n)|}))
−→ (B /∈ bad ∨ n0 6= n)
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Predicate nonLeakMsg m M specifies that if a message m is of the form Crypt (pubK M){|Nonce n0,Agent B,
Crypt (pubK B)(Nonce n)|}, then either B /∈ bad or n0 6= n. This specifies a non-leakage condition of nonce
part n0 in a message of the form Crypt (pubK M){|Nonce n0,Agent B,Crypt (pubK B)(Nonce n)|} which is
sent to the router even if whose nonce part n will be forwarded to the intruder. The following lemma will
explain the intuition behind this definition.
If both the router M and an agent B are honest, and B sends {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M
to M , and nonLeakMsg ma M also holds, then Nonce n0 cannot be analyzed by the intruder.
Lemma 17. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ;M /∈ bad;B /∈ bad; Says B M ma ∈ tr;
ma = {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M ; nonLeakMsg ma M ]]
=⇒ Nonce n0 /∈ analz (knows Spy tr)
Similarly, provided that both M and B are honest, and B sends a dummy message {|Nonce n0|}pubK M to
M , then the intruder cannot get n0.
Lemma 18. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says B M{|Nonce n0|}pubK M ∈ tr;M /∈ bad;B /∈ bad]]
=⇒ Nonce n0 /∈ analz (knows Spy tr)
9.4. Message swapping
By its definition, to prove sender anonymity of an agent X in a trace tr, we need to show the existence
of an observationally equivalent trace tr′. In this section, we present a method for the construction of an
observationally equivalent trace.
9.4.1. The swap function
We first define a function swap ma mb tr, which returns another trace tr′ satisfying the following conditions:
(1) the sender and receiver of any event tr′i in trace tr
′ are the same as in the corresponding event tri in tr;
(2) the message of any event in tr′ is swapped as mb if the message of the corresponding event in tr is ma;
(3) the message of any event in tr′ is swapped as ma if the message of the corresponding event in tr is mb;
(4) otherwise the message is kept unchanged.
consts swap::"msg⇒msg⇒trace⇒trace"
primrec "swap ma mb [] =[]"
swap ma mb (ev#tr)=
case ev of Says A0 M0 ma0) ⇒
(if (ma0=ma)
then Says A0 M0 mb# swap ma mb tr)
else if (ma0=mb)
then Says A0 M0 ma# swap ma mb tr
else ev# (swap ma mb tr))
For a trace tr of Onion Routing, Fig. 1 illustrates the correspondence between tr and the function
swap ma mb tr. In session 1, agent A (B) communicates with C (D), while agent A (B) communicates with
D (C) in session 2. The correspondence between tr and swap ma mb tr is formalized as the lemma below.
Lemma 19. Let tr be a trace.
1. [[(m1,m2) ∈ set (zip (map msgPart tr) (map msgPart (swap ma mb tr)))]]
=⇒ m1 = m2 ∨ (m1,m2) = (ma,mb) ∨ (m1,m2) = (mb,ma)
2. sendRecvMatchL tr (swap ma mb tr)
3. length (swap ma mb tr) = length tr
4. set (map msgpart tr) = set (map msgpart (swap mb ma tr))
5. swap ma mb tr = swap mb ma tr
6. [[(Says X M ma ∈ set tr)]] =⇒ Says X M mb ∈ set (swap ma mb tr))
7. [[(Says X M mb ∈ set tr)]] =⇒ Says X M ma ∈ set (swap ma mb tr))
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Fig. 1. An illustration of function swap.
8. [[m 6= ma;m 6= mb; (Says X M m) ∈ set tr]]=⇒ (Says X M m ∈ set (swap ma mb tr))
9. [[m 6= ma;m 6= mb; (Says X M m) /∈ set tr]]=⇒ (Says X M m /∈ set (swap ma mb tr))
10. [[Says A M ma ∈ tr; Says B M mb ∈ tr; ∀ev.ev ∈ tr −→ (∃ A′ B′ m. ev = Says A′ B′ m)]]
=⇒ map msgPart tr = map msgPart (swap ma mb tr)
11. [[Says A M ma ∈ tr; Says B M mb ∈ tr; ∀ev.ev ∈ tr −→ (∃ A′ B′ m. ev = Says A′ B′ m)]]
=⇒ knows Spy tr = knows Spy (swap ma mb tr)
12. [[(noncesOf ma)∩ (used tr) = ∅; (noncesOf ma)∩ (noncesOf mb) = ∅; nonceDisj mb tr; noncesOf ma 6= ∅]]
=⇒ (noncesOf mb) ∩ (used (swap ma mb tr)) = ∅
13. [[(noncesOf m) ∩ (used tr) = ∅; (noncesOf m) ∩ (noncesOf mb) = ∅; (noncesOf m) ∩ (noncesOf ma) = ∅]]
=⇒ (noncesOf m) ∩ (used (swap ma mb tr)) = ∅
Let tr′ = swap ma mb tr. In Lemma 19, part 1 says that the message of the event tri is almost the same
as that of tr′i except the case when the message is ma or mb. If the message sent in tri is ma, then the
counterpart in tr′i is mb, and vice versa. Part 2 says that each sender and receiver of each event tri is the
same as those of tr′i. Part 3 shows that swap ma mb tr has the same length as tr. Part 4 says that messages
observed from tr is the same as those of swap ma mb tr. Part 5 shows that the trace swap ma mb tr is
the same as swap ma mb tr. Part 6, part 7, part 8, and part 9 show some correspondence of an event
occurring in tr and the corresponding one in tr′. Part 10 and part 11 show that if Says A M ma ∈ tr, and
Says B M mb ∈ tr, for Spy, the set of messages and knowledge obtained from tr is the same as those from
swap ma mb tr. Part 12 says that nonces of mb will be disjoint from those of used tr′ if nonces of ma are
disjoint from those of mb, nonces of ma are disjoint from used tr, nonceDisj mb tr, and nonces of ma are not
empty. Part 13 says that nonces of m will be disjoint from those of used tr′ if nonces of m are disjoint from
those of ma, nonces of m are disjoint from those of mb, and nonces of ma are disjoint from used tr.
9.4.2. swap ma mb tr is an Onion Routing trace
We first define a predicate nonceDisjUntil ma tr stating that nonces of ma are disjoint with any other message
occurring in any tr′ such that tr′ is a prefix of the trace tr with length of tr′ ≤ i.
definition nonceDisjUntil::"msg ⇒ trace ⇒ nat⇒ bool" where
"nonceDisjUntil ma tr i ≡ ∀ tr’. (length tr’ ≤i ∧ tr’∈ tails tr −→nonceDisj ma tr’)"
For a trace tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M and an event SaysAM m occurring in tr, we have nonceDisjUntilm tr.
Lemma 20. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says A M m ∈ set tr ]] =⇒ nonceDisjUntil m tr
If nonceDisjUntil m (ev#tr), then nonceDisjUntil m tr. This is easily derived as the following lemma.
Lemma 21. [[nonceDisjUntil m (ev#tr)]] =⇒ nonceDisjUntil m tr
The next predicate isRouterRecvMsg m M specifies that m is a message sent to the router M . Within this
subsection, when we mention ma and mb (see lemmas below), we always mean that they satisfy the predicates
isRouterRecvMsg ma M and isRouterRecvMsg mb M .
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definition isRouterRecvMsg:: "msg ⇒agent⇒ bool" where
"isRouterRecvMsg m M≡ (∃ n. m=Crypt (pubK M) (Nonce n))∨
(∃ n0 n Y.Y6=M ∧ m= Crypt (pubK M) {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|})"
The predicate bothContained specifies that both ma and mb are contained in the messages of tr if the
length of tr ≥ i.
definition bothContained::"trace ⇒ msg ⇒ msg ⇒ nat ⇒ agent ⇒ bool" where
"bothContained tr ma mb i M ≡ length tr ≥ i −→
((∃ X . Says X M ma ∈ set tr) ∧ (∃ X. Says X M mb ∈ set tr))"
Next lemma specifies an invariant on a trace tr in oneOnionSession i M , if both ma and mb are messages
sent to the router M , nonces of ma and mb are disjoint, nonces of ma (mb) are disjoint with any other
message in any prefix tr′ of tr whose length is less than or equal to i, both ma and mb are contained in the
messages of tr with a length ≥ i, then swap ma mb tr is also a trace in oneOnionSession i M .
Lemma 22. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; (noncesOf ma) ∩ (noncesOf mb) = ∅;
isRouterRecvMsg ma M ; isRouterRecvMsg mb M ]] =⇒
bothContained tr ma mb i M −→ nonceDisjUntil ma tr i −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr i −→ swap ma mb tr ∈
oneOnionSession i M
Proof. We apply induction to prove the lemma, and four subgoals will be generated. For notational conve-
nience, we define the following abbreviations for the conclusion of this lemma:
P ≡ λtr.bothContained tr ma mb i M −→ nonceDisjUntil ma tr i −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr i −→
swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
1. Base case onionNil: Obviously, swap ma mb [] = [], and [] is in oneOnionSession i M .
2. Case onionCons1: Given a trace tr, agents X, Y , nonces n0, n such that tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ,
X 6= M , Y 6= M , Nonce n0 /∈ used tr, Nonce n /∈ used tr, and length tr < i, and the induction hypothesis
(abbrv. IH) P tr, let tr′ = Says X M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr, now
we need to show P tr′. In order to prove this, we only need assume bothContained tr′ ma mb i M ,
nonceDisjUntil ma tr′ i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr′ i, then show swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
First, by length tr < i, bothContained tr ma mb i M trivially holds. From nonceDisjUntil ma tr′ i, by
Lemma 21 we also have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i. Similarly, we have nonceDisjUntil mb tr i. With P tr, we
have (1) swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . Now we do case analysis on the newly added message
m′ = {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M), there are three cases in total:
(a) m′ = ma. Notice that swap ma mb tr′ = Says X M mb#swap ma mb tr. We can easily show
nonces ma ∩ used tr = ∅, because of nonces ma = {n, n0}. With the premises (noncesOf ma) ∩
(noncesOf mb) = ∅, and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i, by Lemma 19-(12) we have (2) used (swap ma mb tr)∩
nonces mb = ∅. From isRouterRecvMsg mb M , then we have two sub-cases:
(a-1) either mb = {|Nonce n′0,Agent Y ′,Crypt (pubK Y ′) (Nonce n′)|}(pubK M) for some n′0, n′, Y ′ where
Y ′ 6= M . From (2), we have Nonce n′0 /∈ used (swap ma mb tr), Nonce n′ /∈ used (swap ma mb tr).
With (1), by rule onionCons1, we can have swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(a-2) ormb = Crypt (pubKM)(Nonce n′) for some n′. From (2), we have Nonce n′ /∈ used (swapmamb tr).
With (1), by rule onionCons2, we can have swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(b) m′ = mb. Similar to Case (a).
(c) Neither m′ = ma nor m′ = mb. From the premise nonceDisjUntil ma tr′ i, we have (noncesOf ma) ∩
(noncesOf m′) = ∅. Similarly, we have (noncesOf mb) ∩ (noncesOf m′) = ∅. By Lemma 19-(13), we
have nonces m′ ∩ used (swap ma mb tr′) = ∅. From this, we have Nonce n0 /∈ used (swap ma mb tr),
Nonce n /∈ used (swap ma mb tr). With (1), by rule onionCons1, we can have swap ma mb tr′ ∈
oneOnionSession i M .
3. Case onionCons2: Similar to Case onionCons1.
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4. Case onionCons3: Given a trace tr, agents X, Y , nonces n0, n such that tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ,
Says X M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M) ∈ set tr, Says M Y Crypt (pubK Y )
(Nonce n) /∈ set tr, i ≤ length tr, and induction hypothesis P tr. Now we need to show P tr′ where tr′ =
Says M Y {|Nonce n|}(pubK M)#tr. In order to prove this, we only assume bothContained tr′ ma mb i M ,
nonceDisjUntil ma tr′ i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr′ i, then show swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
Let t′ = {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M), and t′′ = Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n).
Notice that isRouterRecvMsg ma M , and isRouterRecvMsg mb M , then we have t′′ 6= ma and t′′ 6= mb.
Therefore, (3) swap ma mb tr′ = Says M Y t′′#swap ma mb tr.
Furthermore from t′′ 6= ma and t′′ 6= mb, and bothContained tr′ ma mb i M , we can easily have (4)
bothContained tr ma mb i M . From nonceDisjUntil ma tr′ i, by Lemma 21, we have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i.
Similarly, we have nonceDisjUntil mb tr i. With P tr, we have (5) swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
Now we perform case analysis on t′, there are three cases in total:
(a) t′ = ma. From (4) and i ≤ length tr, we have Says X ′ M mb ∈ set tr for some agent X ′, then
by Lemma 19-(7), we have (6) Says X ′ M t′ ∈ swap ma mb tr. From Says M Y t′′ /∈ set tr, by
Lemma 19-(9), we have Says M Y t′′ /∈ set (swap ma mb tr). With (5) (6), we can easily conclude
swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(b) t′ = mb. Similar to Case (a).
(c) Neither t′ = ma nor t′ = mb. With Says X M t′ ∈ set tr, by Lemma 19-(8), we have Says X M t′ ∈
set (swap ma mb tr). Similar to the argument in case (a), we have Says M Y t′′ /∈ set (swap ma mb tr).
Therefore, with (5) (6), we can easily conclude swap ma mb tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
Lemma 22 is rather complex, we must consider two cases: (1) length tr < i; or (2) length tr ≥ i. For cases
(1), we mainly need to consider when ma (mb) occurs in trace tr, then mb (ma) occurs in swap ma mb.
In order to make the swap ma mb satisfy the rule onionCons1 or onionCons2, mb (ma) should be in a
form which is sent to the router M – these are guaranteed by conditions isRouterRecvMsg ma M and
isRouterRecvMsg mb M . Besides, the nonces created in mb (ma) should be fresh; this is the reason why
premises nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i are needed. In fact, for case (1), we do not need
to require that both ma and mb occur in tr, we can replace ma with a new message which contains fresh
nonces which are disjoint with nonces of tr. However, for case (2), we have to require that both ma and mb
should occur in tr, as ma occurs in tr and the peeled messages of ma and ma′ also occur in tr. We notice
that ma′ also occurs in swap ma mb tr by the definition of swap, in order to make the swap ma mb satisfy
the rule onionCons3. We must require that ma should also occur in swap ma mb tr, thus mb should also
occur in tr.
Based on Lemma 20 and Lemma 22, we conclude an important result: for a trace tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ,
if both ma and mb are sent to the router M by some agent, then swap mamb tr is still in oneOnionSession i M .
This lemma accurately captures the intuition of the function swap which is explained in Fig. 1.
Theorem 23. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says A M ma ∈ set ; Says B M mb ∈ set ]]
=⇒ swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M
Proof. From the premises that Says A M ma ∈ tr and Says B M mb ∈ tr, it is trivial to prove that the
predicate bothContained tr ma mb i M. We have that they are both messages sent to the router M . Thus
the messages ma and mb satisfy that isRouterRecvMsg ma M and isRouterRecvMsg mb M. By Lemma 20,
we have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i. By Lemma 22, we conclude that swap ma mb tr ∈
oneOnionSession i M.
In fact, initially, we want to directly prove the lemma directly by induction. However, during the proof
procedure, we find that we must face the case where only ma (or mb) occurs in tr, therefore we must
strengthen the premises of the lemma, therefore Says A M ma(mb) ∈ set tr is replaced by the premises
isRouterRecvMsg ma(mb) M and nonceDisjUntil ma tr i. When length tr ≥ i, we must require that both
ma and mb must occur in tr because the swap function will not replace any message which is sent by the
router. Therefore premises bothContained tr ma mb i M is added into premises. These are typical techniques
involved when we use induction proof method. We need retune the induction assertion, and the key point is
that the retuned one can be proved in each induction case.
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9.4.3. Alignment properties
By Lemma 16, we can show that the relation, composed of two messages sequences of message parts of tr
and swap ma mb tr, is single valued.
Lemma 24. [[tr ∈ (oneOnionSession i M); r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swap ma mb tr)))]]
=⇒ single valued r
Let r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swap ma mb tr))), Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr)). Af-
ter applying analyzing operations pairwise on tr, we obtain a relation analz pairs tr Kn. Based on Lemma 24,
we show that analz pairs r Kn is single valued.
Lemma 25. [[r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swapmamb tr));Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr));
r′ = analz pairs r Kn;M /∈ bad; tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says A M ma ∈ set tr; Says B M mb ∈
set tr; (m,m′) ∈ r′; (m,m′′) ∈ r′]]
=⇒ m′ = m′′
From Lemma 25, we derive a sufficient condition, as depicted in Lemma 4, in order to prove that
synth pairs (analz pairs r Kn) is single valued.
Lemma 26. [[r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swapmamb tr));Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr));
r′ = analz pairs r Kn; M /∈ bad; tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; nonLeakMsg ma M ;nonLeakMsg mb M ;
Says A M ma ∈ set tr; Says B M mb ∈ set tr; (m,m′) ∈ r′; (m,m′′) ∈ synth pairs r′ Kn]]
=⇒ m′ = m′′
Notice that nonLeakMsg ma M and nonLeakMsg mbM must be added in Lemma 26. Without the two
conditions,ma (mb) can be synthesized from Nonce n ifma = {|Nonce n,Agent Spy, {|Nonce n|}pubK Spy|}pubK M .
Thus both (ma,ma) and (ma,mb) occur in synth pairs r′ Kn. By Lemma 25 and Lemma 4, we can conclude
that synth pairs (analz pairs r Kn) is single valued.
Lemma 27. [[r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swapmamb tr));Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr));
r′ = analz pairs r Kn; nonLeakMsg ma M ; nonLeakMsg mb M ; M /∈ bad; tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ;
Says A M ma ∈ set tr; Says B M mb ∈ set tr; (m,m′) ∈ synth pairs r′ Kn; (m,m′′) ∈ synth pairs r′ Kn]]
=⇒ m′ = m′′
Because the corresponding relation between tr and swap ma mb tr can guarantee that r = r−1, and
the reflexivity can be kept by the analz pairs and synth pairs operators, then (synth pairs r′ Kn)−1 is also
single valued.
Lemma 28. [[r = set (zip (map msgPart tr)(map msgPart (swapmamb tr));Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr));
r′ = analz pairs r Kn; nonLeakMsg ma M ; nonLeakMsg mb M ; M /∈ bad; tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ;
SaysAM ma ∈ set tr; SaysB M mb ∈ set tr; (m,m′) ∈ (synth pairs r′ Kn)−1; (m,m′′) ∈ (synth pairs r′ Kn)−1]]
=⇒ m′ = m′′
9.4.4. Observational equivalence between tr and swap ma mb tr
Let r = zip (map msgPart tr) (map msgPart (swap ma mb tr) and Kn = synth (analz ((knows Spy tr)). For
a pair (ma,mb) ∈ r, ma and mb are observationally equivalent w.r.t. Kn.
Lemma 29. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ;Says A M ma ∈ set tr; Says B M mb ∈ set tr; A /∈ bad; B /∈ bad;
M /∈ bad; ma = Crypt (pubEK M) {|Nonce na0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubEK Y ) (Nonce na)|};
nonLeakMsg ma M ;nonLeakMsg mb M ]]
=⇒ msgEq (synth (analz ((knows Spy tr))) ma mb
Notice that conditions nonLeakMsg ma M and nonLeakMsg mb M guarantee the correctness of na0 and
some nonce part of mb, which in turn guarantees the observational equivalence between ma and mb.
Next we show that swap ma mb tr is observationally equivalent to tr if tr satisfies some constraints. If
ma = {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M , ma is sent to the router M by an honest agent A, and
mb is also sent to the router M by an honest agent B, then tr is observationally equivalent to swap ma mb tr
in the view of the Spy.
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Lemma 30. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; ma = {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M ;
Says A M ma ∈ set tr; Says B M mb ∈ set tr; A /∈ bad;M /∈ bad;B /∈ bad;
nonLeakMsg ma M ; nonLeakMsg mb M ]]
=⇒ obsEquiv Spy tr (swap ma mb tr)
Proof. By the definition of view, we can have (a) view Spy tr = tr from tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . Unfolding
the definition of obsEquiv, by part 3 in Lemma 19, we can prove (b) length (swap ma mb tr) = length tr; by
part 2 in Lemma 19, we also have (c) sendRecvMatchL tr (swap ma mb tr; by part 11 in Lemma 19, we have
(d) set (map msgPart tr) = set ((map msgPart (swapma mb tr))). Let r = (zip (map msgPart tr) (map msgPart
(swap ma mb tr))) and Kn = synth (analz (knows Spy tr)), we need to prove (e)∀ m m′.(m,m′) ∈ r −→
msgEq Kn m m′. We only need to fix two messages m1 and m2 such that (m1,m2) ∈ set r, then prove that
msgEq Kn m1 m2. By Lemma 1, we have either (1) m1 = m2, (2)m1 = ma and m2 = mb, or (3) m1 = mb
and m2 = ma. For the first case, by Lemma 1, we have msgEq Kn m1 m2; for case (2) and (3), they can
be directly proved by Lemma 29. Let r′ = synth pairs(analz pairs r Kn), by Lemma 27 and 28, we have (f)
single valued r′ and single valued (r′)−1.
From (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f), we conclude obsEquiv Spy tr (swap ma mb tr).
9.5. Proving anonymity properties
Let us give two preliminary definitions: the senders in a trace is defined as senders tr M ≡ {A.∃m.SaysAM m ∈
set tr}, a predicate nonLeakTrace tr M ≡ ∀A n0 n Y.Says A M m ∈ set tr −→ A /∈ bad −→ nonLeakMsg m tr
specifying that tr is a trace where each honest agent sends a message satisfying nonLeakMsg m tr.
Message ma′ is forwarded to B by the router M , and is originated by some honest agent, and the trace
satisfies nonLeakMsg m tr, then Spy cannot be sure of the honest agent who originates ma′ if Spy is an
observer. Namely, the sender anonymity holds for the intruder w.r.t. the honest agents who send messages
to M in the session modeled by tr.
Theorem 31. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; ma′ = {|Nonce n|}pubK Y ;
Says M B ma′ ∈ set tr; regularOrig ma′ tr; M /∈ bad; nonLeakTrace tr M ]]
=⇒ senderAnomity (senders tr M − bad) Spy ma′ tr (oneOnionSession i M),
Proof. By unfolding the definition of the predicate senderAnomity, for any agent X ∈ (senders tr M − bad),
fix an agent X, we need to construct a trace tr′ such that tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M and obsEquiv Spy tr tr′
and originates X ma tr′. From Says M B ma′ ∈ set tr, by Lemma 11, there exists A and n0, such that
Says A M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M ∈ set tr. By Lemma 12, we have originates A ma′ tr.
Obviously, by the fact regularOrig ma′ tr, we have A /∈ bad. From the fact X ∈ (senders tr M − bad),
by the definition of senders, there exists an event Says X M mb ∈ set tr, X 6= M , X /∈ bad. Let ma =
{|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M . By nonLeakTrace tr M n, we have both nonLeakMsg ma M
and nonLeakMsg mbM . Let tr′ = swap mamb tr, by Lemma 30, we have obsEquiv Spy tr (swap mamb tr). By
Lemma 23, we have swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . From the fact Says X M mb ∈ set tr, by part 6 in
Lemma 19, we have Says X M ma ∈ swap mamb tr. By Lemma 12, we have originates X ma′ (swap mamb tr).
The last result is about the linkability of a sender A and a peeled onion ma. Suppose that an honest
agent A sends a message m to the router M , and an agent B receives a message ma from M , the intruder
cannot link the message ma′ with the agent A provided that there exists at least one agent X who is not A
and sends a message to M .
Theorem 32. [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; ma′ = {|Nonce n|}pubK Y ; Says M B ma′ ∈ set tr;
regularOrig ma′ tr; Says A M m′ ∈ set tr;A /∈ bad;M /∈ bad;
∃X,mx.Says X M mx ∈ set tr ∧X 6= A ∧X /∈ bad; nonLeakTrace tr M ]]
=⇒ let AS= senders tr M − bad in unlinkability AS A m tr (oneOnionSession i M)
Proof. Let runs = oneOnionSession i M , AS= senders tr M−bad. By unfolding the definition of the predicate
unlinkability, we only need to prove that (1) tr |= 3Spy runs (¬originates A ma′ tr) and (2)senderAnomity AS
Spy ma′ tr runs. Here (1) is our main goal, and (2) is proved in Lemma 31.
From the premise, there exist X and mx such that Says X M mx ∈ set tr, X 6= A, and X /∈ bad. From
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Says M B ma′ ∈ set tr, by Lemma 11, there exists a message m, an agent A′, a nonce n0, such that ma
has the form of Says A′ M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y, {|Nonce n|}pubK Y |}pubK M ∈ set tr. Obviously, by the fact
regularOrig ma′ tr, we have A′ /∈ bad. In order to prove (1), by unfolding the definition of the diamond
operator, we only need construct a trace tr′ such that obsEquiv Spy tr tr′ and ¬originates A ma′ tr. Here
we do case analysis on A′.
If A′ 6= A, then (1) can be proved immediately. Obviously obsEquiv Spy tr tr, tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
By Lemma 14, we have ¬originates A ma′ tr. Otherwise, from A′ = A, we have X 6= A′. let tr′ =
swap mamx tr, by Lemma 30, we have obsEquiv Spy tr tr′. By Lemma 23, we have tr′ ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
From Says X M mx ∈ set tr and Says A M ma ∈ set tr, by Lemma 6, we have Says X M ma ∈ set tr′ and
Says A M mx ∈ set tr′. From X 6= A, by Lemma 14, immediately we have ¬originates A ma′ tr′.
Analyzing the Onion Routing protocol took us about one month’s effort. This time is much longer because
for this protocol we need more time to figure out a new proof technique. The proof script comprises 5,593
lines and executes in one minute.
9.6. A weakness of the protocol
Here, we show a weakness of the onion routing protocol, which is hinted by the premise nonLeakTrace tr M .
Namely, without this condition, the sender anonymity and unlinkability may not hold. For example, con-
sider the session shown in Fig. 1, the trace tr in (1) is not observationally equivalent to that in (2)
when C = D = Spy, na = na′, nb = nb′, and na 6= nb. Because after the router M forwards messages
{|Nonce na|}pubK Spy and {|Nonce nb|}pubK Spy, the Spy can analyze na and nb, respectively, and distinguish the
two nonces, then he can distinguish the two messages {|Nonce na,Agent Spy, {|Nonce na|}pubK Spy|}pubK M and
{|Nonce nb,Agent Spy, {|Nonce nb|}pubK Spy|}pubK M .
10. Conclusion
We have formalized the notion of provable anonymity in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. The inductive
approach is one of the most important techniques we adopted. We proposed an inductive definition of message
distinguishability based on the observer’s knowledge, then defined message equivalence as the negation of
message distinguishability. Next, we inductively define the alignment relation between message sequences,
which is a key factor to construct a reinterpretation function on which the observational equivalence between
traces is based. In the end, we inductively formalize the semantics of Crowds and Onion Routing, and
formally prove anonymity properties for the protocols in our formal framework, i.e., sender anonymity for
Crowds, sender anonymity and unlikability for Onion Routing. The inductive approach helps us to define
the semantics of observational equivalence, and protocol semantics as well. Correspondingly the inductive
proof method is the most effective one to reason about the properties of the inductively defined semantics of
anonymity protocols. Therefore, selecting a proper proof assistant is important which has built-in support
for the inductive approach, which will make it feasible to mechanize all the theory in the theorem prover.
Our choice is Isabelle, which plays a key role in our formalization.
When we prove that anonymity properties, e.g., sender anonymity, hold for a trace under consideration,
we need manually to construct the existence of another trace which is observationally equivalent to the given
trace, but differs, for example, in the sender of some message. This is the essence of information hiding
on the senders or the linkage between a message and its sender, which makes the analysis of anonymity
different from analysis on secrecy and authentication. For secrecy and authentication, normally the focus
is on individual traces. However, the observer decides whether two traces are observationally equivalent
according to his knowledge obtained in two traces, which usually boils down to the secrecy of some terms.
Therefore, the induction proof method used in the analysis of secrecy properties can still be applied here.
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Appendix
We briefly present some Isabelle concepts, notations and commands, and our notation conventions. Read-
ers might find these useful if they want to check our Isabelle proof scripts.
Isabelle’s meta-logic is a fragment of Church’s theory of simple types, which can be used to formalize an
object-logic [33]. Normally, we use rich infrastructure of object-logics such as HOL to formalize some theory,
which has been provided by the Isabelle system. Important connectives of the meta-logic are as follows:
implication (=⇒) is for separating premises and conclusion of theorems; equality (≡) definitions; universal
quantifier (
∧
) parameters in goals. In our work, we use the object-logic HOL to formalize the strand space
theory. Therefore, we briefly show how to use HOL to formalize a theory.
Theories. Working with Isabelle means creating theories. A theory is a file with a named collection of types,
functions, and theorems, proofs. The general format of a theory T is as follows:
theory T = B1 +B2 + . . .+Bn;
declarations for types, definitions, lemmas, and proofs
end
where B1, B2, . . . , Bn are the names of existing theories that T is based on. For our purpose, we only need
to import HOL library Main to write the theory anonymity.thy.
Types. There are basic types such as bool, the type of truth values; nat, the type of natural numbers. Func-
tion types are denoted by ⇒, and product types by ×. Types can also be constructed by type constructors
such as list and set. For instance, nat list declares the type of lists whose elements are natural numbers.
Terms. Forms of terms used in this paper are rather simple. It is simply a constant or variable identifier, or
a function application such as f t, where f is a function of type τ1 ⇒ τ2, and t is a term of type τ1. Formulas
are terms of type bool. The type bool has two basic constants True and False and the usual logical connectives
(in decreasing order of priority): ¬, ∧, ∨, −→, ∀, and ∃, all of which (except the unary ¬) associate to the
right. Note that the logical connectives introduced here are also used in the object-logic HOL.
Introducing new types. There are three kinds of commands for introducing new types. typedecl name
introduces new “opaque” type name without definition; types name = τ introduces an abbreviation name
for type τ . datatype command can introduce a recursive data type. A general datatype definition is of the
following form
datatype (α1, . . . , αn) = C1 τ11 . . . τ1k1 | . . . | Cm τm1 . . . τmkm
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where αi are distinct type variables (the parameters), Ci are distinct constructor names and τij are types.
Note that n can be 0, i.e., there is no type parameters in datatype declaration.
Definition commands. consts command declares a function’s name and type. defs gives the definition of
a declared function. constdefs combines the effect of consts and defs. Combining the consts and inductive
commands, we can give an inductive definition for a set. An inductively defined set S is typically of the
following form:
consts S :: τset inductive S intros
rule1 : [[a11 ∈ S; . . . ; a1k1 ∈ S;A11, . . . , A1i1 ]] =⇒ a1 ∈ S
...
rulen : [[an1 ∈ S; . . . ; ankn ∈ S;An1, . . . , Anin ]] =⇒ an ∈ S
Lemmas. According to Isabelle’s style, we use the notation lemma name : [[A1;A2; . . . ;An]] =⇒ B to denote
that with assumptions A1, . . . , An we can derive a conclusion B. Inline with Isar’s style, a lemma is written
as lemma name : assumes a1 : “A1” and . . . and an : “An” shows B.
Proof scripts and proof states. In Isabelle’s tactics-based style, a proof script comprises a sequence
of applications of tactics: apply tac1, . . . , apply tacn done. The script will be executed by Isabelle until all
subgoals are solved. A typical proof in Isar has a human-readable structure as follows:
proof
assume asm0 and . . . and asmm
have formula1
proof ....(*proof script for formula1*) qed
...
have formulan
proof ....(*proof script for formulan*) qed
have formulan+1
proof ....(*proof script for formulan+1*) qed
qed
where asm0, . . . , asmm are assumptions, formula1 , . . . , formulan are intermediate results. From the assump-
tions and intermediate results, we can show the final goal formulan+1 .
Techniques such as case distinction, induction, calculational reasoning in the Isar language can make our
proof structured, which are immensely more readable and maintainable than apply-scripts. But the price
we pay is that the length of proof in Isar is usually much longer than that of the counterpart in Isabelle
tactical style. Therefore, we adopt a mixed style in our formalized proofs: we use commands in the Isar style
to decompose a large goal into subgoals to keep our proof with a clear structure; when a subgoal is simple
enough, we directly use apply-scripts to prove the subgoal, thus we can keep the length of our proof script
relatively short. After processing a proof command, Isabelle will display a proof state:∧
x1, . . . , xp. [[A1;A2; . . . ;An]] =⇒ B
where x1, . . . , xp are local constants, A1, . . . , An are local assumptions, and B is the actual (sub)goal in this
proof state. Note that
∧
is the universal quantifier in the meta-logic, instead of the conjunction operator
(∧) in the object logic HOL.
Notation conventions. Throughout this paper, we use the following conventions for meta-variables:
tr, tr′ range over traces
m, ma, mb range over messages
i, j range over natural numbers for lengths of traces
A, B, X, M range over agent names
k1, k2 range over keys
N , Na, Nb, n, na range over nonces
Kn range over message sets which represent knowledge of agents
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A brief view of mechanical rule induction. Isabelle has built-in support for inductive approaches. After
we type an inductive definition oneOnionSession as shown in Sect. 9.1, Isabelle will automatically generate
an elimination rule oneOnionSession.induct as follows:
[[ tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M;
P [];∧
tr X Y n0 n.
[[ tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M; P tr; X 6= M; Y 6= M; Nonce n0 /∈ used tr;
Nonce n /∈ used tr; length tr < i ]]
=⇒ P (Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) {|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|})# tr);∧
tr X n.
[[ tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M; P tr; X 6= M; Nonce n /∈ used tr; length tr < i]]
=⇒ P (Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) (Nonce n)) # tr);∧
tr X n0 Y n.
[[ tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M; P tr; i ≤ length tr;
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) {|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}) ∈ set tr;
Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)) /∈ set tr]]
=⇒ P (Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)) # tr)]]
=⇒ P tr
oneOnionSession.induct formalizes an induction proof method on traces of an Onion Routing protocol.
Namely, if we want to prove P tr for any trace tr ∈ oneOnionSession M i. We first need to prove P []; second
we need to prove P tr =⇒ P (ev#tr), where ev is an event ev added into the trace tr which is defined
according to the rules onionCons1-onionCons3.
In the following discussions, we show how to formally prove Lemma 22 in Isabelle. First we need to write
a lemma to specify the proof goal by a lemma command. For Lemma 22, we define it in Isabelle as follows:
lemma trace invariant:
assumes a1:"tr:oneOnionSession k M" and a2:"(noncesOf ma) ∧ (noncesOf mb) =∅" and
a3:"isRouterRecvMsg ma M" and a4: "isRouterRecvMsg mb M"
shows " bothContained tr ma mb k M−→ nonceDisjUntil ma tr k −→nonceDisjUntil mb tr k
−→ (swap ma mb tr: oneOnionSession k M)" (is "P tr")
After defining the lemma, we need to ask Isabelle to assist us to prove the goal, and use the com-
mand using a1 proof induct to apply the induction rule oneOnionSession.induct to solve the goal. The premise
tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M will be eliminated. Note that the property P under consideration in this
lemma is “λtr.bothContained tr ma mb k M −→ nonceDisjUntil ma trk −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr k −→
swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M”. According to the definition of oneOnionSession.induct, four proof
goals will be automatically generated by Isabelle. Here we only present the second one:
2.
∧
tr X Y n0 n.
[[tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M; noncesOf ma ∧ noncesOf mb = ∅;
isRouterRecvMsg ma M; isRouterRecvMsg mb M;
bothContained tr ma mb k M−→nonceDisjUntil ma tr k −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr k
−→ swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M;
X6=M; Y 6=M; Nonce n0 /∈ used tr; Nonce n /∈ used tr; length tr < k]] =⇒
bothContained(Says X M ({|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr)ma mb k M
−→nonceDisjUntil ma(Says X M {|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr) k
−→nonceDisjUntil mb(Says X M {|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr) k
−→swap ma mb(Says X M {|Nonce n0, Agent Y, Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr)
∈ oneOnionSession k M
Notice that the fifth premise is the induction hypothesis P tr, and the conclusion to be shown is
P (Says X M {|Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|}(pubK M)#tr). From the above, we can see
that this lemma is not trivial, and the proof obligations involved are rather complex. Isabelle can help us in
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an induction proof: selecting proper induction rule to execute, generating subgoals for base case and induc-
tion steps. It is error-prone for human to perform these tasks. However, Isabelle/Isar can automatically finish
these tasks in a mechanical way. After the subgoals are created, our proof structure is naturally decomposed
into four parts: one for the base case onionNil, the other three for the induction cases: onionCons1-onionCons3.
Besides, for the typical proof techniques of using case analysis as shown in the proof of Lemma 22, we
use Isar commands for calculational reasoning to perform the proof of all case analysis. Thanks to the Isar
proof script language provided by Isabelle, the mechanical proof structure has a similar structure as the one
shown in Sect. 9.4.2.
